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Abstract
This paper evaluates the dynamic response of worker ￿ ows, job ￿ ows, and
vacancies to aggregate shocks in a structural vector autoregression. We iden-
tify demand, monetary, and technology shocks by imposing sign restrictions on
the responses of output, in￿ ation, the interest rate, and the relative price of
investment. No restrictions are placed on the responses of job and worker ￿ ows
variables. We ￿nd that both investment-speci￿c and neutral technology shocks
generate responses to job and worker ￿ ows variables that are qualitatively sim-
ilar to those induced by monetary and demand shocks. However, technology
shocks have more persistent e⁄ects. The job ￿nding rate largely drives the re-
sponse of unemployment, though the separation rate explains up to one third.
For job ￿ ows, the destruction margin is more important than the creation mar-
gin in driving employment growth. Measuring reallocation from job ￿ ows, we
￿nd that monetary and demand shocks do not have signi￿cant e⁄ects on cu-
mulative job reallocation, whereas expansionary technology shocks have mildly
negative e⁄ects. We also estimate shock-speci￿c matching functions. Allowing
for a break in 1984:Q1 shows considerable subsample di⁄erences in matching
elasticities and relative shock-speci￿c e¢ ciency.
JEL: C32, E24, E32, J63.
Keywords: business cycles, job ￿ ows, unemployment, vacancies, vector au-
toregressions, worker ￿ ows.
￿We are grateful to Larry Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, Luca Dedola, Daniel Levy, ￿va
NagypÆl, Dale Mortensen, Frank Smets and seminar participants at the ECB for helpful comments.
We thank Olivier Blanchard, Hoyt Bleakley, Steven Davis, Jonas Fisher, and Robert Shimer for
sharing their data. Helge Braun and Reinout De Bock thank the research department at the St.
Louis Fed and the ECB, respectively, for their hospitality. Reinout gratefully acknowledges ￿nan-
cial support of a Dehousse Fellowship of the Speciaal Fonds voor Onderzoek at the University of
Antwerp. Any views expressed are our own and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. All errors are our own. Corresponding
author: Riccardo DiCecio, Riccardo.DiCecio@stls.frb.org
11 Introduction
How do labor market variables, such as job and worker ￿ ows, respond to di⁄erent
shocks? What is the contribution of job loss and job destruction versus hiring and
job creation to the evolution of aggregate employment and unemployment? Earlier
research suggests that the cyclicality of employment can be best understood by look-
ing at the ￿ ows into rather than the ￿ ows out of unemployment. This line of research
is summarized in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and is consistent with the
search and matching model with endogenous job destruction developed by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994).1 Recently part of the literature has taken a di⁄erent route.
Hall (2005b), and Shimer (2005b) argue that the business cycle dynamics of the labor
market are determined mostly by the job ￿nding rate and not by the separation rate.2
This paper further examines the relationship of the labor market to the business
cycle. We study both worker and job ￿ ows data. For worker ￿ ows data we take
the hiring and separation rate constructed as in Shimer (2005b). The job ￿ ows
data are the spliced 1947-2004 quarterly job creation and destruction series recently
assembled by Faberman (2004), and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005). We
take a look at the unconditional business cycle properties of these series. We evaluate
the dynamic responses of key labor market variables to di⁄erent shocks in a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR). We use sign restrictions on the impulse responses of
output, in￿ ation, and the federal funds rate to identify demand, monetary, and supply
shocks.3 The sign restrictions are consistent with a basic IS-LM-AD-AS framework
and with microfounded new Keynesian models. Furthermore, we divide supply shocks
into neutral and embodied shocks based on the response of the price of investment,
measured in output units. Our approach is asymmetric in that we leave the responses
of the worker and job ￿ ows variables unrestricted. This is intentional, as we want to
examine the responses of these variables, a measure of vacancies, the implied level
of employment growth, the unemployment rate, and the reallocation rate to di⁄erent
shocks.
Section 2 describes the empirical background of the di⁄erent readily available
labor market data we use and presents business cycle features of the postwar U.S.
worker and job ￿ ows. Unconditional ￿ltered moments of the job versus worker ￿ ow
data suggest a somewhat di⁄erent picture of the labor adjustment mechanism at
the business cycle frequency. Job destruction and the separation rate are positively
correlated. The job creation and job ￿nding rates are orthogonal. The job ￿nding
rate is strongly procyclical, whereas the correlation of job creation with output is low.
The separation and job destruction rate are both strongly countercyclical. In terms
1Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) study job ￿ ows. Worker
￿ ows are extensively studied in Abowd and Zellner (1985), Poterba and Summers (1986), and Blan-
chard and Diamond (1990).
2Related papers are Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2005a). See Davis (2005) on the key role cyclical
￿ uctuations in job loss and worker displacement nevertheless play in the data.
3Sign restrictions achieve identi￿cation without imposing zero contraints on the impact response
or on the long-run response of certain variables to shocks. Other implementations of sign restrictions
can be found in Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002), Dedola and Neri (2004), Uhlig (2005), and Peersman
(2005).
2of relative volatilities, job destruction is one-and-a-half times more volatile than job
creation, whereas the job ￿nding rate is twice as volatile as the separation rate.
Section 3 lays out the SVAR. We ￿nd that responses to all shocks are qualitatively
similar, with the supply shocks generating more persistent e⁄ects than monetary and
demand shocks. An expansionary shock leads to a persistent hump-shaped increase
in vacancies, mirrored by an increase in the job ￿nding rate. The separation rate
drops initially, but returns to its steady state value faster than the job ￿nding rate.
Responses of the job destruction rate are similar in shape but larger in magnitude than
the responses of the separation rate. Compared with the ￿nding rate, the responses of
job creation have wider bands and are less hump-shaped. The bulk of the response of
unemployment is due to changes in the job ￿nding rate, though separations contribute
up to one third to the response of unemployment and are especially important in the
initial phase after the shock. The dynamics of the job ￿ ows data, on the other hand,
suggest that the destruction margin plays a bigger role than the creation margin in
driving employment growth.
We also examine the responses of job reallocation, the sum of job creation and
destruction, to the di⁄erent shocks. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) propose this mea-
sure and emphasize that worker reallocation associated with their measure provides
a lower bound on total worker reallocation. As in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), we
￿nd that job reallocation falls following expansionary shocks. Focusing on cumulative
job reallocation, we ￿nd no signi￿cant permanent e⁄ects after demand or monetary
shocks. Expansionary technology shocks, on the other hand, have mildly negative
e⁄ects on cumulative reallocation. This result is in contrast with Caballero and
Hammour (2005), who ￿nd that expansionary aggregate shocks increase cumulative
job reallocation.
A number of papers have documented a substantial drop in the volatility of out-
put, in￿ ation, interest rates, and many other macroeconomic variables since the mid-
1980s.4 There has been relatively little work in examining how this drop is related
to the labor market dynamics. We take a ￿rst stab at this question by breaking our
sample in a pre-1984 and post-1984 periods. We then examine the impulse responses
and estimates of a matching function under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas func-
tional form after di⁄erent shocks. Estimates of the elasticities within each sample are
relatively close. However, the matching function for the pre-1984 sample shows de-
creasing returns to scale, whereas the post-1984 sample suggests strongly decreasing
returns to scale and more congestion in the labor market. We also observe substantial
shifts in the relative e¢ ciency of the matching function following money and demand
shocks versus the two technology shocks in the two subsamples.
The last subsection of section 3 discusses a reallocation shock identi￿ed from job
￿ ows variables. Section 4 concludes.
The major contribution of our paper is to o⁄er an integrated analysis over a
large sample of the response of job and worker ￿ ows to shocks identi￿ed using sign
restrictions on aggregate variables while being agnostic on the responses of key labor




For worker ￿ ows data, we use the separation and job ￿nding rates constructed by
Shimer (2005b). We brie￿ y discuss their construction in Section 2.1. For job ￿ ows
data, we take the job creation and destruction series recently constructed by Faber-
man (2004) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005), as discussed in Section
2.2. Section 2.3 presents business cycle statistics of the data.
2.1 Separation and Job Finding Rates
The separation rate measures the rate at which workers leave employment and enter
the unemployment pool. The job ￿nding rate measures the rate at which unemployed
workers exit the unemployment pool. Although the rates are constructed and inter-
preted while omitting ￿ ows between labor market participation and non-participation,
Shimer (2005b) shows that they capture the most important cyclical determinants of
the behavior of both the unemployment and employment pools. The advantage of
using these data lies in its availability for a long time span. The data constructed by
Shimer is available from 1947, whereas worker ￿ ow data including non-participation
￿ ows from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is available only from 1967 onwards.
The idea is to use data on the short-term unemployment rate as a measure of
separations and the law of motion for the unemployment rate to back out a measure
of the job ￿nding rate. The size of the unemployment pool is observed at discrete
dates t;t+1;t+2:::. Hirings and separations occur continuously between these dates.
To identify the relevant rates within a time period, assume that between dates t and
t + 1, separations and hirings occur with constant Poisson arrival rates st and ft,
respectively: For some ￿ 2 (0;1), the law of motion for the unemployment pool Ut+￿
is
￿
Ut+￿ = Et+￿st ￿ Ut+￿ft;
where Et+￿ is the pool of employed workers. Here, Et+￿st are simply the in￿ ows and
Ut+￿ft the out￿ ows from the unemployment pool, at t+￿. The analogous expression
for the pool of short-term unemployed Us
t+￿ (i.e., those workers who have entered the
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t+￿ft:
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t+￿)ft:
Solving the di⁄erential equation using Us





4Given data on Ut; Ut+1, and Us
t+1, this expression can be used to construct the job
￿nding rate ft. The separation rate then follows from






where Lt ￿ Ut + Et. Given the job ￿nding rate, ft, and labor force data, Lt and
Ut, equation 1 uniquely de￿nes the separation rate, st. Note that the rates st and






Ut+1 , respectively. The
construction of st and ft takes into account that workers may experience multiple
transitions between dates t and t + 1. Note also that these rates are continuous
time arrival rates. The corresponding probabilities are St = (1 ￿ exp(￿st)) and
Ft = (1 ￿ exp(￿ft)).
Using equation 1, observe that if ft+st is large, the unemployment rate,
Ut+1
Lt ; can
be approximated by the steady state relationship st
ft+st: As shown by Shimer (2005b),
this turns out to be a very accurate approximation to the true unemployment rate.
We use it to infer changes in unemployment from the responses of ft and st in the
SVAR. To gauge the importance of the job ￿nding and separation rates in determining
unemployment, we follow Shimer (2005b) and construct the following variables:
￿ st
st+ft is the approximated unemployment rate;
￿ ￿ s
￿ s+ft is the unemployment rate computed with the actual job ￿nding rate, ft,
and the average separation rate, ￿ s;
￿ st
st+ ￿ f is the unemployment rate computed with the average job ￿nding rate, f,
and the actual separation rate, s:
The accuracy of the identi￿cation scheme for the separation and job ￿nding rates
above depends crucially on a consistent and unbiased measure of the short-term un-
employment rate. We discuss some of the resulting issues in appendix B and compare
the construction used by Shimer (2005b) to alternatives. For the SVAR and business
cycle analysis, we stick with Shimer (2005b).
The identi￿cation of the job ￿nding and separation rates ft and st above assumes
that all workers are either unemployed or employed. Transitions into and out of
the labor force are not accounted for. As documented in Shimer (2005b) for the
three-pool data available from the CPS from June 1967 onwards, transitions from
unemployment to employment and conversely from employment to unemployment
are the most important contributing factors to cyclical changes in unemployment and
(albeit to a lesser extent) employment. In the overlapping sample, the job ￿nding
rate is in turn highly correlated with an analogously constructed transition rate for
the three-pools data and shows a similar volatility. For the separation rate, however,
the volatility of the transition rate from the three-pools data is signi￿cantly higher
and the correlation between the two is lower. A further discussion can be found in
appendix C.
Lastly, we want to point out that measuring the in￿ ow side of the employment
pool using the job ￿nding rate is di⁄erent from using the hiring rate. The hiring
5rate sums all worker ￿ ows into the employment pool and scales them by current
employment (see Fujita (2004)). Its construction is analogous to the job creation
rate de￿ned for job ￿ ows. The response of this rate to shocks is in general not very
persistent, whereas the response of the job ￿nding rate indicates persistence. This
di⁄erence is due to the scaling. We return to this point below.
2.2 Job Creation and Job Destruction
The job ￿ ows literature focuses on job creation (JC) and destruction (JD) rates.5
Gross job creation is the employment gains summed over all plants that expand or
start up between t￿1 and t. Gross job destruction, on the other hand, is the employ-
ment losses summed over all plants that contract or shut down between t ￿ 1 and t.
To obtain the creation and destruction rates, both measures are divided by the aver-
ages of employment at t￿1 and t. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) constructed
measures for both series from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) and the
monthly Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS).6 A number of researchers work only with the quarterly job creation and
job destruction series from the LRD.7 Unfortunately this series is available only for
the 1972:Q1-1993:Q4 period.
In this paper we work with the quarterly job ￿ ows constructed by Faberman
(2004), and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005) from three sources. These
authors splice together data from the (i) BLS manufacturing Turnover Survey (MTD)
from 1947 to 1982, (ii) the LRD from 1972 to 1998, and (iii) the Business Employment
Dynamics (BED) from 1990 to 2004. The MTD-LRD data are spliced as in Davis
and Haltiwanger (1999), whereas the LRD-BED splice follows Faberman (2004).8
A fundamental accounting identity relates the net employment change between
any two points in time to the di⁄erence between job creation and destruction. We
de￿ne g
JC;JD






￿ JCt ￿ JDt. (2)
The data spliced from the MTD and LRD of the job creation and destruction rates
constructed by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005), pertains to the manufac-
turing sector. However, over the period 1951:Q2-2004:Q2, the implied growth rate
of employment from these job ￿ ows data, g
JC;JD
E;t ￿ (JCt ￿ JDt), is highly correlated
5See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999), Caballero and Hammour (2005), and Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2005).
6As pointed out in Blanchard and Diamond (1990) these job creation and destruction measures
di⁄er from true job creation and destruction as (i) they ignore gross job creation and destruction
within ￿rms, (ii) the point-in-time observations do not take into account job creation and destruction
o⁄sets within the quarter, and (iii) the failure to account for newly created jobs that are not ￿lled
with workers yet.
7Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) extend the series back to 1948. Some authors report that this
extended series is (i) somewhat less accurate and (ii) only tracks aggregate employment in the
1972Q1-1993Q4 period (See Caballero and Hammour (2005)).
8See Appendix D for a comparison of job ￿ ows data to worker ￿ ows data.













As in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), we de￿ne gross job reallocation rt
as:
rt ￿ JCt + JDt: (3)
Using this de￿nition we examine the reallocation e⁄ects of a particular shock in
the SVARs. We also look at cumulative reallocation.
2.3 Business Cycle Properties
Table 1 reports correlations and standard deviations (relative to output) for the busi-
ness cycle component of worker ￿ ows, job ￿ ows, the unemployment rate (u), vacancies
(v) and output (y).10 The job ￿nding rate and vacancies are strongly procyclical. Job
creation is moderately procyclical. The separation rate, job destruction and the un-
employment rate are countercyclical. Job destruction is one-and-a-half times more
volatile than job creation. The job ￿nding rate is twice as volatile as the separation
rate. Notice that job destruction and the separation rate are positively correlated,
whereas job creation and the job ￿nding rate are orthogonal to each other.
In Table 2 we report correlations of the three unemployment approximations de-
scribed in Section 2.1 with actual unemployment, and standard deviations (relative
to actual unemployment). The steady state approximation to unemployment is very
accurate, and the job ￿nding rate plays a bigger role in determining unemployment.
The contribution of the job ￿nding rate is even larger at cyclical frequencies.11
3 Structural VAR Analysis
In this section, we analyze the response of the key labor market variables to macroeco-
nomic shocks using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR). The variables included
in the SVAR analysis are the growth rate of the price of investment relative to the
GDP de￿ ator (￿lnpI), the growth rate of average labor productivity (￿lnY=l), the
in￿ ation rate (￿lnp), hours (lnl), worker ￿ ows (job ￿nding and separation rates),
job ￿ ows (job creation and destruction), a measure of vacancies (lnv), and the fed-
eral funds rate (ln(1 + R)). Worker ￿ ows are the job ￿nding and separation rates
constructed in Shimer (2005b). Job ￿ ows are the job creation and destruction series
from Faberman (2004) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005). Sources for the
other data are given in Appendix A. The sample covers the period 1954:Q3-2004:Q2.
The variables are required to be covariance stationary. To achieve stationarity, we
9The correlation of g
JC;JD
E;t with the growth rate of employment in manufacturing is 0:93.
10See appendix A for additional data sources.
11Shimer (2005a) uses an HP ￿lter with smoothing parameter 105. His choice of an unusual ￿lter
to detrend the data further magni￿es the contribution of the job ￿nding rate to unemployment with
respect to the ￿gures we report.
7linearly detrend the logarithms of the job ￿ ows variables. The estimated VAR coef-
￿cients corroborate the stationarity assumption.
Consider the following reduced form VAR given by12:
Zt = ￿ +
Pp
j=1 AjZt￿j + ut; Eutu
0
t = V: (4)












The reduced form residuals, ut, are related to the structural shocks, ￿t, by ￿t =
A0ut or equivalently by ut = C￿t, where C = A
￿1
0 . Also, the structural shocks are
orthogonal to each other, i.e. E￿t￿0
t = I. We identify structural shocks using sign
restrictions on the responses of output, the price level, the interest rate, and the price
of investment.13
3.1 Identi￿cation
The identifying assumptions on the impulse responses to the respective shocks are as
follows:
￿ An expansionary monetary shock is one that has a non-negative e⁄ect on output
(for 4 quarters), the price level (for 4 quarters), and a non-positive e⁄ect on the
interest rate (for one quarter). A (non-monetary) demand shock instead has a
non-negative e⁄ect on the interest rate on impact.
￿ Positive supply shocks do not lower output (for 4 quarters) and have a non-
positive e⁄ect on the price level (for 4 quarters) and the interest rate (for one
quarter). An embodied technology shock is a supply shock that has a non-
positive e⁄ect on the price of investment (for 4 quarters). A supply shock that
does not satisfy this latter restriction will be labeled a neutral technology shock.
The restrictions are summarized in Table 3.
The identi￿cation scheme is implemented following a Bayesian procedure. We
adopt a Je⁄reys (1961) prior on the reduced form VAR parameters:
p(B;V ) / kV k
￿ n+1
2 ;
where B = [￿;A1;A2]
0 and n is the number of variables in the VAR. The posterior
distribution of the reduced form VAR coe¢ cients belongs to the inverted Wishart-
normal family:
(V jZt=1;:::;T) ￿ IW
￿









12Based on information criteria, we estimate a reduced form VAR including 2 lags, i.e. p = 2.
13The sign restriction approach to identify structural shocks was pioneered by Uhlig (2005).
8where ^ B and ^ V are the OLS estimates of B and V , T is the sample length, k =





















Consider a possible orthogonal decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix, i.e.
a matrix C such that V = CC0. Then CQ, where Q is a rotation matrix, is also
an admissible decomposition. The posterior distribution on the reduced form VAR
coe¢ cients, together with a uniform distribution over the rotation matrices, and an
indicator function equal to zero on the set of IRFs that violate the identi￿cation
restrictions, will induce a posterior distribution over the IRFs that satisfy the sign
restrictions above.
The sign restrictions are implemented as follows:
1. Try one possible rotation, Q, for the decomposition matrix, C, for each Monte
Carlo draw from the assumed inverted Wishart-normal family for (V;B) in (5)
and (6). We obtain the random rotation matrix Q by generating a matrix X
with independent standard normal entries, taking the QR factorization of X,
and normalizing so that the diagonal elements of R are positive.
2. Check the signs of the impulse responses to all the structural shocks. If we ￿nd
impulse responses that match all the restrictions, we keep the draw. Otherwise
we discard it.
3. We continue until we have 1000 valid decompositions.
The acceptance rate is 32.6% on the whole sample. In the subsample estimates
presented in subsection 3.5, the acceptance rate is 27.4% on the pre-1984:Q1 subsam-
ple, and 7.2% on the post-1984:Q1 subsample.
3.2 Results
Figures 3-5 report the median, 16th, and 84th percentiles of 1,000 draws from the
posterior distribution of acceptable IRFs to the structural shocks of non-labor market
variables (restricted in our identi￿cation scheme), labor market variables (on which we
do not impose any restrictions) together with output and other variables of interest.
Even though we do not restrict the response of labor productivity, the IRFs of
average labor productivity to supply shocks display a persistent increase (see Figure
6). Productivity shows no persistent response to demand and monetary shocks. The
IRFs of productivity suggest that the supply shocks we identify are indeed inter-
pretable as technology shocks, and comparable to technology shocks identi￿ed with
long-run restrictions (see Lopez-Salido and Michelacci, 2005).
All labor market variables (see Figure 4) respond in a similar way to monetary
and demand shocks. Also the IRFs to neutral and embodied shocks are similar to
9each other in shape and magnitude. Technology shocks generate responses that are
qualitatively similar to those induced by monetary and demand shocks, but that have
a more persistent e⁄ect.
The IRFs of the job ￿nding rate and vacancies are similar in shape to the hump-
shaped response of output for all shocks. The separation rate IRFs to the various
shocks are U-shaped. The largest e⁄ect is reached earlier for the separation rate than
for the job ￿nding rate. The job ￿nding rate responds about twice as much as the
separation rate for all shocks. The responses of the job destruction rate are similar
in shape to those of the separation rate, but are larger in magnitude. The responses
of the job creation rate are the mirror image of the IRFs of the job destruction rate.
Job destruction responds to shocks twice as much as job creation does.
From the job ￿ ows perspective, the destruction margin is more important in re-
sponse to the four shocks we identify. Worker ￿ ows￿responses suggest the opposite:
the creation margin is the most important. Recall, however, that the job ￿nding
probability measures the exit rate from the unemployment pool, whereas the job cre-
ation rate measures an entry rate into the employment pool (in terms of jobs), from
￿rms￿perspective.
Figure 5 reports the IRFs of unemployment, employment growth (implied by
equation 2), and the reallocation rate (equation 3).
The unemployment rate decreases for 10 quarters in response to monetary and
demand shocks and overshoots its steady state value before converging back to it.
The response of the unemployment rate decreases in a U-shaped way in response to
technology shocks. For all shocks, the response of the unemployment rate is mostly
determined by the e⁄ect on the job ￿nding rate, although the separation rate con-
tributes up to one third of the total e⁄ect. In terms of job ￿ ows, however, the response
of employment growth is largely driven by job creation.
Figure 8 reports the median of the posterior distribution of variance decomposi-
tions, i.e., the percentage of the j-periods-ahead forecast error accounted for by the
identi￿ed shocks. The forecast error of output and hours is mostly driven by supply
shocks, consistent with Fisher (2003). Of the four shocks we identify, the demand
shock plays the most important role in terms of the variance decomposition of job
￿ ows. Each of the other three shocks contributes half as much as the demand shock.
For worker ￿ ows, technology shocks of either kind are the most important source of
the forecast error variance, up to 40 quarters ahead. There is no clear pattern for
vacancies.
3.3 Comparison with Existing Literature
The IRFs of job creation and destruction to a monetary shock are consistent with
Trigari (2004). The di⁄erences in the responses of the interest rate and of the in￿ ation
rate stem from the di⁄erent identi￿cation schemes. A monetary shock identi￿ed with
contemporaneous restrictions typically has a very persistent e⁄ect on the interest
rate and generates a price puzzle.14 Identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks via
14See Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and LindØ (2005) and Braun (2005).
10sign restrictions implies a less persistent interest rate response and it excludes the
possibility of a price puzzle by construction.
Fujita (2004) identi￿es a unique aggregate shock in a tri-variate VAR including
worker ￿ ows variables (scaled by employment) and vacancies. This aggregate shock
is identi￿ed by restricting the responses of employment growth (non-negative for 4
quarters), the separation rate (non-positive on impact), and the hiring rate (non-
negative on impact). Our ￿ndings on the responses of aggregate shocks identi￿ed
without restricting the behavior of worker/job ￿ ows are broadly consistent with the
existence of a unique aggregate shock. However, for our identi￿cation we prefer to
study the e⁄ect of aggregate shocks on worker/job ￿ ows without restricting these
labor market variables.
Note that where we use the job ￿nding probability in our VAR, Fujita (2004)
includes the hiring rate to measure worker ￿ ows into employment. The hiring rate
measures worker ￿ ows into employment, scaled by the size of the employment pool.
The job ￿nding rate measures the probability of exiting the unemployment pool.
Although both arguably re￿ ect movements of workers into employment (see Shimer,
2005b), the di⁄erence in scaling leads to a di⁄erent qualitative behavior of the two
series in response to an aggregate shock. The response of the job ￿nding rate shows
a persistent increase. Fujita￿ s hiring rate initially increases but quickly drops below
zero because of the swelling employment pool.
All four aggregate shocks increase the growth rate of employment and reduce real-
location (see Figure 5).15 We do not ￿nd a signi￿cant permanent e⁄ect on cumulative
reallocation for the monetary and demand shock (see Figure 7). For the technology
shocks, the cumulative e⁄ect on reallocation is mildly negative. This is at odds with
Caballero and Hammour (2005), who ￿nd that expansionary aggregate shocks have
positive e⁄ects on cumulative reallocation.
Furthermore, our results do not support a Schumpeterian creative destruction
e⁄ect for a neutral technology shock and are in sharp contrast with Lopez-Salido
and Michelacci (2005). They ￿nd that neutral technology shocks increase job de-
struction and reduce employment growth. Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2005) use a
much shorter sample (1972:Q1-1993:Q4) and identify technology shocks with long-run
restrictions, as in Fisher (2003).
3.4 Estimating the Matching Function
We also check if the matching process of unemployed workers and vacancies depends
on the shock considered. In the standard search and matching model of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), the number of hires is related to the size of the unemployment
pool and the number of vacancies via a matching function M (U;V ).16 Assuming a
Cobb-Douglass functional form, the matching function is given by
M (U;V ) = AU
￿uV
￿v;
15The extensive and intensive margins behave in a similar way: both hours and employment
increase in response to positive aggregate shocks.
16Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the matching function literature.
11where ￿v is the elasticity of the number of matches with respect to vacancies and
measures the positive externality caused by ￿rms on searching workers; ￿u is the
elasticity with respect to unemployment and measures the positive externality from
workers to ￿rms; A captures the overall e¢ ciency of the matching function.
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS), the job ￿nding rate can
then be expressed as:
lnft = lnA + ￿(lnvt ￿ lnut): (7)
If we do not impose CRS, we get:
lnft = lnA + ￿v lnvt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿u)lnut:
To consider the e⁄ect of the shocks we identi￿ed on the matching function, we
consider a sample of 1,000 draws from the posterior distributions of A and the elas-
ticity parameters estimated from arti￿cial data. Each draw involves the following
steps:
1. Consider a vector of accepted residuals as if the shock(s) of interest were the
only structural shock(s);
2. Use this vector of accepted residuals and the VAR coe¢ cients from the inverted
Wishart-Normal family (5) ￿ (6) to generate arti￿cial data ~ Zt;
3. Construct unemployment using the steady state approximation ~ ut+1 = ~ st=
￿
~ st + ~ ft
￿
from the arti￿cial data;
4. Regress ln ~ ft on either lnvt and lnut (not assuming CRS) or ln(~ vt=~ ut) (under
the CRS assumption).
The arti￿cial data constructed using only monetary shocks, for example, induce
a posterior distribution for ￿ and A for an hypothetical economy in which monetary
shocks are the only source of ￿ uctuations.
Table 4 reports the median, 16th, and 84th percentiles of 1,000 draws from the
posterior distributions. The ￿rst two columns show the estimates for ￿v and A when
we impose CRS. The CRS estimates suggest that aggregate shocks do not entail a
di⁄erential e⁄ect on the matching process. The estimated e¢ ciency parameters A
are somewhat lower for monetary and demand shocks than for technology shocks,
but these median estimates di⁄er by not more than 5% and the median estimates for
￿v are similar. The last three columns of Table 4 show the unrestricted estimates for
￿v, ￿u, and A. Not imposing CRS leads to a di⁄erent picture. Estimates of ￿v and ￿u
across the shocks are close but the sum of the coe¢ cients is around 0.70, corresponding
to decreasing returns to scale. There is a bigger di⁄erence in the median estimates of
the e¢ ciency parameter. A is more than a quarter higher in the case of the demand
versus the embodied shock (1.10 compared with 0.86). This suggests matching occurs
more e¢ ciently in the wake of monetary and demand shocks than after technology
shocks.
123.5 Subsample Stability
A number of papers have documented the large drop in the volatility of output,
in￿ ation, interest rates, and many other macroeconomic variables since the mid-1980s.
Motivated by the results of this literature, we now break our sample in a pre-1984
and post-1984 period (see, e.g., Kim and Nelson (1999)). Figures 13 and 14 present
the impulse responses of the variables in our system for the pre-1984 and post-1984
period, respectively. In general, the post-1984 responses are smaller than the pre-84
and whole sample responses. This seems the case across all shocks. Given that we
normalize the shocks (impulse response to one standard deviation), this is consistent
with the Great Moderation literature.
Tables 5 and 6 present the matching function estimates for the two subperiods.
Three results are noteworthy: First, estimates of the elasticities ￿v and ￿u for the
di⁄erent shocks are relatively close within each sample. Second, if we do not impose
CRS, all estimates for the pre-1984 sample show decreasing returns to scale. This is
consistent with the results for the full sample discussed above. If we turn to the post-
1984 sample, all estimates of ￿v and ￿u suggest strongly decreasing returns to scale
(sum of both elasticities around 0.40). The elasticity of the job ￿nding probability
with respect to unemployment, ￿(1￿￿u), more than doubled for some shocks in the
post-1984 sample. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) de￿ne this elasticity ￿u ￿ 1 as
the negative externality (congestion) caused by the unemployed on other unemployed
workers. We ￿nd this negative externality doubled in the case of some shock for
the post-1984 sample. Likewise Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) de￿ne ￿v ￿ 1 as
the negative externality placed by ￿rms on each other. This measure fell as well.
The lower elasticity estimates for both ￿v and ￿u in the later period indicate more
congestion and less-positive externalities on the labor market. Third, there has been
a substantial shift in the relative e¢ ciency of the matching function following money
and demand shocks versus the two technology shocks. In the pre-1984 sample the
median estimate of A in an economy with, for example, only monetary shocks is
more than four times higher than the median estimate after an embodied shock. This
relative e¢ ciency is much lower in the post-1984 sample: the estimate for A in the
case of the monetary shock is only half as high as the estimate for the embodied
shock.
3.6 Reallocation Shocks
Although the shocks identi￿ed above have an impact on reallocation, their identi-
￿cation is based on an aggregate shock interpretation. This section proposes an
alternative SVAR to assess the e⁄ect of a purely allocative shock. The exact role
such an allocative shock plays has been a recurrent question in the study of the labor
market over the business cycle.17 Reallocation of labor across employment opportu-
nities could be induced by demand shifts (primarily between sectors) or technological
innovations (primarily between ￿rms or establishments).
17See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
13We identify aggregate and allocative shocks by restricting the responses of the
job creation and job destruction rates, together with output.18 Placing restrictions
on the job ￿ ows is similar in spirit to Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), the di⁄erence
being that we also include output, average labor productivity, and vacancies in our
analysis. We assume an allocative shock simultaneously increases job creation and
job destruction rates, while lowering output on impact (the underlying assumption
is that it takes time to reallocate labor). These restrictions should capture both
between-establishment and between-sector allocative shocks. An aggregate shock, on
the other hand, increases output, increases job creation, and decreases job destruction.
The identifying restrictions are summarized in Table 7. Note that ￿as opposed to
the earlier identi￿cation scheme ￿we place restrictions on the job ￿ ows variables. In
line with the analysis above, we leave the responses of worker ￿ ows unrestricted. We
restrict the response of job creation for only 2 quarters. This is done to account for
the fact that even though the number of jobs created may be persistently high, the
rate may decrease as soon as the employment pool expands.
Figure 9 displays the IRFs of labor market variables to an aggregate and allocative
shock.19 For ease of comparison the allocative shock presented in the ￿gure is one
that is favorable to the current allocation of resources (i.e., a negative allocative
shock that increases output and lowers both job creation and destruction). Figure 10
displays the responses of the unemployment rate, the change in employment growth,
and the reallocation rate. The response of output to the allocative shock is less
pronounced and less persistent than to the aggregate shock. Relative to the response
of output, the responses of the job ￿nding and separation rates and vacancies behave
similarly. The di⁄erence lies in the responses of job creation and job destruction.
This discrepancy is consistent with the identifying sign restrictions. Aggregate shocks
move job creation and job destruction in opposite directions, whereas allocative shocks
imply comovement. Note that vacancies and the job ￿nding rate increase (slightly) in
response to an allocative shock that lowers reallocation. Consequently, the allocative
shock reduces vacancy creation and the job ￿nding rate. Figure 11 plots the response
of average labor productivity to an aggregate and reallocative shock. The reallocative
shock has a negative e⁄ect on labor productivity on impact and there are no signi￿cant
long-run e⁄ects. Part of the literature has developed models where recessions are
associated with a more e¢ cient allocation of resources by "cleansing" out less e¢ cient
matches and creating the incentive for more e¢ cient production opportunities. The
reallocative shock identi￿ed here does not lead to a signi￿cant increase in average
labor productivity and gives empirical support to the "sullying" e⁄ect of recessions
studied in Barlevy (2002). The sullying e⁄ect of recessions comprises the notion that
even under the cleansing of the least e¢ cient matches, both overall productivity and
match-quality of new jobs is lower in downturns.
18Di⁄erent identifying assumptions have been proposed in the literature. If reallocation takes
place between sectors, the dispersion of sectorial employment growth rates should increase (Lillien
(1982)). Furthermore, as reallocation re￿ ects shifts in pro￿tability across ￿rms, measures of stock
price dispersion should go up (Loungani, Rush, and Tave (1990)). See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)
for more details.
19The acceptance rate was 64.9%.
14Figure 12 shows the cumulative responses of the reallocation rate for both the
aggregate and allocative shocks. Following a positive aggregate shock, cumulative
reallocation falls, then gradually recovers and stays below average. Caballero and
Hammour (2005) ￿nd that positive aggregate shocks cumulatively result in increased
rather than reduced reallocation (or restructuring). Our results suggest that cumula-
tive reallocation is lower following a positive aggregate shock. Cumulative reallocation
increases following the allocative shock, as de￿ned in Table 7, and does not recover.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we carry out a joint analysis of aggregate data on job and worker ￿ ows
to get a detailed view of the business cycle behavior of the postwar U.S. labor market.
We report business cycle moments and calculate the dynamic response of the key labor
market variables to aggregate shocks in a set of structural vector autoregressions.
Unconditional business cycle moments show that worker and job ￿ ows data paint
somewhat di⁄erent pictures of the labor market. In terms of relative volatilities
for example, job destruction is one-and-a-half times more volatile than job creation,
whereas the separation rate is half as volatile as the job ￿nding rate. This discrepancy
also emerges in the dynamic response of these variables to aggregate shocks. The job
￿nding rate largely drives the response of unemployment whereas the separation rate
explains up to one third of unemployment ￿ uctuations. For the job ￿ ows data, on
the other hand, the destruction margin is more important than the creation margin
in driving employment growth. These observations integrate and con￿rm the results
of other recent studies. We consider this evidence in favor of labor market models
where the hiring or separation decision is modeled explicitly.
In terms of responses to di⁄erent aggregate shocks, our main conclusion is that
worker and job ￿ ows variables, qualitatively, behave very similarly. We do ￿nd that
technology shocks generate more persistent e⁄ects. Monetary and demand shocks
do not have signi￿cant e⁄ects on cumulative job reallocation, while expansionary
technology shocks have mildly negative e⁄ects on cumulative reallocation. Estimates
of the matching function corroborate the approach of existing search and matching
models in that shocks imply similar matching elasticties. On the other hand, we
observe substantial subsample shifts in both the estimates of these elasticities and
the relative shock-speci￿c e¢ ciency of the matching function. Understanding what
drives these shifts could clarify the interaction of the labor market with the observed
drop in aggregate volatility since the mid 1980s.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Business-Cycle Components. 1954:Q3-2004Q2. Stan-
dard deviations (relative to output) are shown on the diagonal. All series were logged







































Table 2: Contribution of the Job Finding and Separation Rate to Unemployment:
Levels and Business Cycle Component. The business cycle component is extracted
with a HP(1600) ￿lter. Block-bootstrapped con￿dence intervals in brackets.
19Variable Monetary Shock Demand Shock Neutral shock Embodied Shock
Output " (4) " (4) " (4) " (4)
Price Level " (4) " (4) # (4) # (4)
Interest Rate # (1) " (1) # (1) # (1)
Price of Investment ￿ ￿ ￿ # (4)
Table 3: Sign Restrictions (duration in quarters in parentheses)
CRS no CRS





























































Table 4: Matching Function Estimates: Elasticities and Matching E¢ ciency. Median
of the posterior distribution; 16th and 84th percentiles in parenthesis.
Pre 84 CRS no CRS





























































Table 5: Matching Function Estimates Pre 1984: Elasticities and Matching E¢ ciency.
Median of the posterior distribution; 16th and 84th percentiles in parenthesis
20Post 84 CRS no CRS





























































Table 6: Matching Function Estimates Post 1984: Elasticities and Matching E¢ -
ciency. Median of the posterior distribution; 16th and 84th percentiles in parenthesis
Variable Aggregate Shock Allocative Shock
Output "(4) #(1)
Job Creation "(2) "(2)
Job Destruction #(3) "(3)
Table 7: Sign Restrictions for an Aggregate and Allocative Shock (duration in quarters
in parentheses)






































Figure 1: Worker Flows: Levels and Business Cycle Components.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for Other Variables of Interest (percentage
points). The dotted lines are the contributions of the separation rate (in the ￿rst row) and
job destruction (second row). The dashed lines are the contributions of the job ￿nding rate
(￿rst rate) and job creation (second row).
































Figure 6: Response of Average Labor Productivity (%)



















































































Figure 8: Variance Decompositions. Figure shows percentage of the j-periods ahead
forecast error explained by monetary shocks (points), demand shocks (solid), neutral
technology (dotted), embodied technology shocks (dashed).























































































Figure 9: Aggregate versus. Allocative Shock: Impulse Response Functions for Labor
Market Variables (%). For ease of comparison the allocative shocks is presented as the
shock increasing current output (i.e. a ￿ negative￿allocative shock that lowers both job
creation and destruction).
























































Figure 10: Aggregate versus Allocative Shock: Other Variables (ppts). The dotted
lines are the contributions of the separation rate (in the ￿rst row) and job destruction
(second row). The dashed lines are the contributions of the job ￿nding rate (￿rst row) and
job creation (second row).




















Figure 11: Aggregate versus Reallocative Shock: Response of Average Labor Produc-
tivity (%). The allocative shocks is presented as the shock increasing current output (i.e.
a ￿ negative￿allocative shock that lowers both job creation and destruction).
















Figure 12: Cumulative E⁄ect on Reallocation Rate (ppts). The allocative shocks is
presented as the shock increasing current output (i.e. a ￿ negative￿allocative shock that









































































































































Figure 13: Impulse Response Functions for Labor Market Variables (%): Sample and
pre-1984 and post-1984 Subsamples. The green lines are the pre-1984 subsample, the























































































































Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions for Non-labor Market Variables (%): Sample
and pre-1984 and post-1984 Subsamples. The green lines are the pre-1984 subsample,
the red lines the post-1984 subsample, and the black lines the whole sample.
34Variable Units Haver (USECON)
Civilian Noninstitutional Population Thousands LN16N
Real GDP Bil. Chn. 2000 $, SAAR GDPH
GDP: Chain Price Index Index, 2000=100, SA JGDP
Federal Funds (e⁄ective) Rate % p.a. FFED
Hours of all persons (Nonfarm Bus. Sector) Index, 1992=100, SA LXFNH
Index of Help-Wanted Advertising in Newpapers Index, 1987=100, SA LHELP
Civilian Labor Force (16yrs +) Thoursands, SA LF
Civilian Unemployment Rate (16yrs +) %, SA LR
Table A.1: Raw data
A Data
Table A.1 describes the raw data used in the paper and provides the corresponding
Haver mnemonics. The data are readily available from other commercial (e.g., DRI-
WEFA) and non-commercial (e.g., the St. Louis FRB database FREDII) databases,
as well as from the original sources (BEA, BLS, Board of Governors of the FRS).
The price of investment goods is measured as in Fisher (2003).20 The price of
investment is converted in real terms by dividing it by the GDP de￿ ator (JGDP).















20We are grateful to Jonas Fisher for sharing with us his investment price data, which we updated
to 2004:Q2.
35B Measuring Short-term Unemployment
The 1994 redesign of the CPS changed how the unemployment duration question is
asked. The literature on the redesign furthermore indicates the presence of serious
measurement problems regarding short-term unemployment in the old CPS. Prior to
January 1994 unemployed workers in all eight rotation groups were asked how long
they had been unemployed. Since the redesign the CPS has not asked a worker who
is unemployed in consecutive months the duration of the unemployment spell. The
BLS rather calculates unemployment duration as the sum of unemployment duration
in the ￿rst month plus the intervening number of weeks.
To take into account the 1994 redesign of the CPS Shimer (2005b) uses the short-
term unemployment rate for the full CPS sample from January 1948 up to January
1994. For the post 1994 era he works with only incoming rotation groups. The
rationale for doing so is that from February 1994 to March 2004 (in the redesigned
CPS), the number of short-term unemployed was 38.6% of total unemployed in the
full sample but 44.6% in the incoming rotation groups. Shimer (2005b)￿ s use of only
incoming rotation groups post 1994 leads to a consistent time series of the short-term
unemployment.
This measure is not necessarily unbiased. To the extent that people underestimate
their own duration of unemployment, there will be an upward bias in the short-
term unemployment series prior to the redesign. In fact, evidence from Polivka and
Rothgeb (1993) suggests that the duration of unemployment in the unrevised survey
was not reported consistently for individuals who had been unemployed in previous
months. Polivka and Miller (1998) con￿rm this result using the unrevised CPS from
November 1992 through December 1993.21 In the revised CPS automatic updating
should eliminate such reporting inconsistencies. Unemployed individuals who are
looking for work or are laid o⁄ have initial durations automatically increase by four
or ￿ve weeks in the subsequent month.22
We ￿nd that using a Polivka-Miller adjusted short-term unemployment rate in-
stead of Shimer￿ s does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the cyclical properties of st and ft (see
Table B.1), although their means are di⁄erent (see Figure B.1).
21From Polivka and Miller (1999): "When unemployment durations were collected independently
from the unrevised CPS from November 1992 through December 1993 only 26.1 percent of those
unemployed in consecutive months increased their reported durations by four weeks plus or minus
a week. Only 15.3 percent increased their length of unemployment by exactly four weeks. Approxi-
mately 46 percent of those unemployed in consecutive months reported a duration in the subsequent
month that was less than three weeks greater than the duration reported in the previous month,
and 28.5 percent reported a duration that was more than ￿ve weeks greater than the length of
unemployment reported in the previous month."
22Another source of bias could come from short jobs held between monthly interviews. Direct
questioning conducted from July 1991 to October 1991 during the testing of the revised CPS indi-
cated that only 3.2 percent of those looking for work in consecutive months had worked between
interviews.

























































Table B.1: Correlation Matrix of Business-Cycle Components. 1954:Q3-2004Q2.
Standard deviations are shown on the diagonal. All series were logged and detrended
using a HP(1600) ￿lter. Block-bootstrapped con￿dence intervals in brackets.





























































































Table C.1: Correlation Matrix of Business-Cycle Components. 1967:Q1-2004Q2.
Standard deviations are shown on the diagonal. All series were logged and detrended
using a HP(1600) ￿lter. Block-bootstrapped con￿dence intervals in brackets.
C 3-Pools Data
The identi￿cation of the job ￿nding and separation rates ft and st above assumes that
all workers are either unemployed or employed. Transitions into and out of the labor
force are not accounted for. We use gross worker ￿ ows data from the CPS to check
if such a simpli￿cation is defendable at the business cycle frequency. Unfortunately
the three-pool data are only available from June 1967 onwards. As in Shimer (2005b)
we compute from the gross worker ￿ ows at time t transition rates ￿
XY
t for workers
who were in state X and moved to state Y during period t: We also consider the
e⁄ect of adjusting the gross ￿ ows for spurious transitions stemming from corrections
of missclassi￿cation errors in successive interviews. We use the weights from Bleakley,
Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999). They are averages of the time varying factors calculated
in Abowd and Zellner (1985) for the period January 1976 to May 1986.
Notice that the unemployment-to-employment (UE) transition rates are highly
correlated to the job ￿nding rate, and they are less volatile. The employment-to-
unemployment (EU) transition rates are less correlated with the separation rate, and
more volatile. This suggest that Shimer￿ s job ￿nding and separation rates might over-
state the contribution of the hiring margin to the cyclical variation of unemployment.
For data availability reasons we decided to use Shimer￿ s data in the SVAR analysis
in this paper.
























Figure C.1: Hiring and UE Transition Rate; Separation and EU Transition Rate.
39D Job versus Worker Flows Data
The job ￿nding and separation rates focus on the unemployment pool. Ignoring
the time aggregation adjustment, the job ￿nding rate rate is equal to the number
of unemployed workers who found a job within a period scaled by the size of the
unemployment pool. The job ￿ ows data, on the other hand, captures the total ￿ ows
into employment, where both job creation and destruction are scaled by employment.
Worker ￿ ows data o⁄er an alternative way of representing employment in￿ ows
by scaling the number of workers who ￿nd a job in a given period by the size of
the employment pool. If in￿ ows from non-participation are included, this represen-
tation is analogous to the one used in job ￿ ows data in the sense that the di⁄erence
between in￿ ows and out￿ ows yields the growth rate of employment. We take the
three-pool data from Shimer (2005b) for the shorter sample (1967:Q2-2004:Q2) and
undo the time aggregation to make the data comparable to the job ￿ ows data. We
then construct an ins ratio from the worker ￿ ows data as the total ￿ ows into employ-






The outs ratio is the total ￿ ows out of employment to unemployment (EUt) and





Substracting equation (9) from equation (8), we de￿ne the net change in employ-







￿ inst ￿ outst. (10)
The correlation of employment growth calculated from the raw ￿ ows as in equation
(10) with BLS civilian employment growth is 0:72. Adjusting the gross ￿ ows with
the means of the factors calculated as in Abowd and Zellner (1985), increases this
correlation to 0:77.24 Table D.1 presents the correlation matrix of the business-cycle
components of the ins and outs ratio de￿ned in (8) and (9). These gross ￿ ows were
adjusted using the means of the time varying factors calculated as in Abowd and
Zellner (1985) from January 1976 to May 1986. This table shows that the ins and
outs ratios de￿ned from worker ￿ ows have signi￿cantly di⁄erent cyclical properties
from the job creation and destruction series. The standard deviations of the ins and
23Scaling by the average of the current and lagged employment stock as opposed to lagged total
employment, does not change the results.
24The correlation of gW
E with total non-farm employment growth is 0.71. For this sample the
corresponding correlation of g
JC;JD
E is 0.88. The correlation of g
JC;JD
































































Table D.1: Correlations Matrix of Business-Cycle Component of the Ins and Outs
to Employment and Job Creation and Destruction Series, 1967Q2-2004Q2. Standard
deviations (relative to output) are shown on the diagonal. All series were logged
and detrended using a HP ￿lter with weight 1600. Block-bootstrapped con￿dence
intervals in brackets. "AZ" is the adjusted series using the means of the time-varying
factors calculated in Abowd and Zellner (1985) for the period January 1976 to May
1986. The worker ￿ ows are scaled by employment at time t.
outs ratio are about half the standard deviations of the job creation and destruction
rates. The job creation and destruction rate are negatively correlated, whereas the
correlation between the ins and outs ratios is positive. Furthermore, inst is negatively
correlated with output, whereas the correlation of job creation with output is positive.
We also observe that the relative volatility of inst and outst is much lower than
the relative volatility of the hiring and separation rate. Measuring ins and outs of
employment using worker ￿ ows, we ￿nd that the outs are almost as volatile as the
ins.
41